Logo

American Security Council Foundation

Back to main site

Alan W. Dowd is a Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes on the full range of topics relating to national defense, foreign policy and international security. Dowd’s commentaries and essays have appeared in Policy Review, Parameters, Military Officer, The American Legion Magazine, The Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, The Claremont Review of Books, World Politics Review, The Wall Street Journal Europe, The Jerusalem Post, The Financial Times Deutschland, The Washington Times, The Baltimore Sun, The Washington Examiner, The Detroit News, The Sacramento Bee, The Vancouver Sun, The National Post, The Landing Zone, Current, The World & I, The American Enterprise, Fraser Forum, American Outlook, The American and the online editions of Weekly Standard, National Review and American Interest. Beyond his work in opinion journalism, Dowd has served as an adjunct professor and university lecturer; congressional aide; and administrator, researcher and writer at leading think tanks, including the Hudson Institute, Sagamore Institute and Fraser Institute. An award-winning writer, Dowd has been interviewed by Fox News Channel, Cox News Service, The Washington Times, The National Post, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and numerous radio programs across North America. In addition, his work has been quoted by and/or reprinted in The Guardian, CBS News, BBC News and the Council on Foreign Relations. Dowd holds degrees from Butler University and Indiana University. Follow him at twitter.com/alanwdowd.

ASCF News

Scott Tilley is a Senior Fellow at the American Security Council Foundation, where he writes the “Technical Power” column, focusing on the societal and national security implications of advanced technology in cybersecurity, space, and foreign relations.

He is an emeritus professor at the Florida Institute of Technology. Previously, he was with the University of California, Riverside, Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, and IBM. His research and teaching were in the areas of computer science, software & systems engineering, educational technology, the design of communication, and business information systems.

He is president and founder of the Center for Technology & Society, president and co-founder of Big Data Florida, past president of INCOSE Space Coast, and a Space Coast Writers’ Guild Fellow.

He has authored over 150 academic papers and has published 28 books (technical and non-technical), most recently Systems Analysis & Design (Cengage, 2020), SPACE (Anthology Alliance, 2019), and Technical Justice (CTS Press, 2019). He wrote the “Technology Today” column for FLORIDA TODAY from 2010 to 2018.

He is a popular public speaker, having delivered numerous keynote presentations and “Tech Talks” for a general audience. Recent examples include the role of big data in the space program, a four-part series on machine learning, and a four-part series on fake news.

He holds a Ph.D. in computer science from the University of Victoria (1995).

Contact him at stilley@cts.today.

Turkey Humiliated NATO; If NATO Can't Expel It, Here's Plan B

Thursday, January 25, 2024

Categories: ASCF News

Comments: 0

by Michael Rubin
Middle East Forum Observer
January 24, 2024

NATO_image_wikipedia

Turkey's blackmail of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over Sweden's accession is the latest episode to raise questions about whether Turkey's belongs in the alliance. Certainly, NATO leaders and many in the White House will celebrate Turkey agreeing to Swedish accession after a 22-month delay but, while NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg lavishes praise on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the reality is Turkey subordinates NATO's interests to its own material benefit. It plays Russia and the United States off each other, and it double-deals as Turkey arms Ukraine while helping Russia evade sanctions.

NATO defines its purpose "to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means" and says it "promotes democratic values." Turkey today makes a mockery of such values: Freedom House ranks Turkey as NATO's most undemocratic member.

For too long, NATO leaders and their Western counterparts have been in denial about Turkey. Some explain Turkey is simply too important, especially as it has the second largest military in NATO. This metric is deceptive, though. It is not the size of the army that matters, but rather the political willingness to use it.

The idea that the problem will resolve itself if Erdoğan leaves office or dies is fantasy given how he has shaped the education of 32 million Turks and how he molded the military into his own image during his 21-year dictatorship. The same is true with Turkey's media and bureaucracy.

NATO's value to Erdoğan, however, is that he can be a Trojan horse and block consensus on every decision until NATO members meet his price.

Turkey today is a liability. There is no mechanism within NATO to expel a wayward member. In the past, countries withdrew voluntarily. In 1966, for example, France left NATO's integrated military command after a series of internal disputes, although Charles De Gaulle simultaneously reaffirmed France's commitment to the alliance's collective defense. Eight years later, Greece withdrew from NATO command after Turkey invaded Cyprus. Both countries ultimately rejoined.

NATO's value to Erdoğan, however, is that he can be a Trojan horse and block consensus on every decision until NATO members meet his price. For Sweden, this means repressing free speech or extraditing dissidents. For the United States, this could mean giving Turkey F-16s.

If NATO cannot force Turkey out, could it compel it to leave? Yes.

Defense historian Kori Schake notes an example from the second Berlin Crisis in 1958. As the Soviet Union again challenged the status of West Berlin, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France implemented "Live Oak." The idea was to involve in planning cells those NATO members most likely to fight, effectively creating a fait accompli for other NATO members. Such a concept today would mean privileging reliable NATO members over potential filibustering from Turkey.

John Maurer, professor of strategy at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, speculates that NATO reformers could interpret France's voluntary separation from NATO command in 1966 as indicating that being party to the NATO Treaty does not necessarily guarantee participation in all NATO structures, especially at the military level.

Rather than embrace wishful thinking and recognizing the impossibility of giving Turkey the boot, it is time to quarantine NATO's Trojan horse.

NATO could also move its Land Command (LANDCOM) out of Izmir. Should Turkey veto transfer through its presence within the North Atlantic Council, NATO could respond by setting up a parallel command and then slowly letting LANDCOM whither. Either way, NATO might signal its displeasure with Erdoğan's antics by assigning the new or relocated structure to Alexandroupoli or Stockholm.

NATO might make Turkey's presence in NATO uncomfortable in other ways. NATO members could informally lock Turks out of certain organizations by refusing Turks appointments. Here, there is also precedent, as Turkey regularly uses its veto to forbid speakers critical of Erdoğan from attending the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Likewise, just as "Five Eyes" formalizes intelligence sharing among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, a "NATO Minus One" code might prevent regular intelligence sharing with Turkish officials. Such a move is prudent given both Turkey's willingness to target dissidents across Europe and its support for the Islamic State.

Effective defense requires an appreciation of reality. Turkey no longer provides NATO the foundation or value it once did. Denial about Erdoğan's ideology or his impact on the Turkish military can be deadly. Rather than embrace wishful thinking and recognizing the impossibility of giving Turkey the boot, it is time to quarantine NATO's Trojan horse.

Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Comments RSS feed for comments on this page

There are no comments yet. Be the first to add a comment by using the form below.